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Alternative dispute resolution and the 
Magistrate’s Courts in Ghana: 
A case of practical hybridity 
 
Richard C Crook 
 
Since 2005 the Magistrate’s Courts in Ghana have been offering Court-connected 
‘alternative dispute resolution’ (ADR) for litigants who opt for an amicable settlement 
through mediation. To what extent has this form of state-supported ADR been successful 
at providing justice which is both more expeditious and accessible than the formal courts 
and congruent with popular values and expectations?  It was found that the programme 
was genuinely accessible, and did fulfil popular desires for dispute settlement to be a 
‘truth seeking’ and balanced process, as well as offering enforceable agreements. But it 
was less effective than expected because mediators faced considerable resistance in 
achieving agreements, with a settlement rate of only 40-50%. The role of the state 
institutions as ‘practical hybrids’ was crucial in combining the authority, organisational 
support and professional mediation skills necessary for such a programme, with 
responsiveness to shared popular values and expectations. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In our previous Working Paper (Crook et al., 2010) we argued that, contrary to current 
stereotypes of state justice in Africa, state courts and paralegal institutions in Ghana are 
providing forms of civil dispute resolution which are popular, reasonably accessible and 
congruent with the expectations and values which ordinary citizens have about justice. The 
Magistrate’s (District) Courts and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ) in particular were found to be offering the remedies which people wanted for 
different kinds of disputes, using procedures which were both informal (hence 
comprehensible) and seen as fair or impartial, in accordance with popular definitions of 
fairness as a ‘balanced process’. 
 
In the case of the CHRAJ, its dispute resolution service is based on the use of a modern and 
internationally accepted form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) which focuses on 
mediation and the construction of mutually accepted agreements between individual disputing 
parties. The Magistrate’s Courts, however, offer a much broader range of procedures and 
codes of settlement combining formal legal remedies and application of statute, common and 
customary laws with informal procedures, and the opportunity to use ADR if chosen by the 
litigants. The hybridity of the Magistrate’s Courts provides an opportunity to investigate further 
the differences between court adjudications, which no matter how informal or user-friendly, 
are bound by formal law, and ADR.  
 
In this paper we ask, therefore: how successful is state-sponsored ADR in Ghana ? Does it 
provide justice which is both more expeditious and accessible than the formal courts and also 
                                                     
  Richard Crook is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK 
(r.crook@ids.ac.uk ). He and the Local Justice research team are grateful to DFID UK and Irish Aid for 
their generous funding of this APPP research; all opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not 
represent DFID or Irish Aid. 
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congruent with popular demands and values?  Can it solve the crisis of an overloaded state 
courts system, as anticipated by official government policy for encouraging ADR, or is there 
still a role for the formal courts even at local level dealing with small scale, first instance civil 
cases?  The focus will be on the procedures and codes of law used in the Court-Connected 
ADR service; how legitimate, accessible and effective are they, compared to formal trials in 
the full Court?1 
 
2 ADR and legal reform in Africa 
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is currently extremely popular in justice sector reform 
programmes throughout the developing world, and has been officially introduced in India, 
Bangladesh, and various Latin American and African states in recent years (see Penal 
Reform International, 2001). It is generally advocated as offering a cheaper, faster and more 
accessible form of justice for ordinary citizens, particularly the rural and urban poor, who do 
not have access to state justice either because of lack of resources, social exclusion or lack 
of physical access (distance). On a more practical level, it is also seen as a remedy for 
relieving the crisis of overburdened state courts facing impossible backlogs of unresolved 
cases.  
 
The essence of the modern ADR concept, as developed by its European and North American 
advocates, is the idea that a better form of justice can be obtained by focussing on mediation 
or the search for a mutually agreed settlement, rather than on binding adjudication by an 
external (usually state) authority. Mediators based on both state and non-state institutions can 
offer ADR; what makes it different from the practice in formal courts is the procedure, which is 
‘de-legalised’, relying on an informal search for an agreed and just solution, as opposed to 
deciding who has won or lost. This emphasis on ‘better’ and ‘non-compulsory’ justice 
distinguishes the recent ADR movement from the already well-established contractual forms 
of commercial ADR, which rely on binding arbitration and may exclude the right to go to court 
(Harvard Law Review, 2000).  
 
In European and North American states, the ADR concept is based on three main 
assumptions:  
 
 Disputes are about individual rights and thus dispute resolution requires agreement 
between the individual parties. This is most appropriate in urban societies where one 
cannot assume a ‘community public’ with an interest in social harmony or groups 
which will somehow police the settlement between the parties.  
 
 ADR will be monitored so as to ensure fair procedure, and should not lead to denial of 
the right to trial under the law (Harvard Law Review, 2000: 1869).  
 
 ADR is based on finding a neutral mediator who will help the parties to bargain freely 
in order to reach an agreed settlement without pressure or intimidation -- an 
assumption which has provoked much criticism from those who argue that ADR 
enthusiasts too often ignore differences in status and power between the parties 
(Nader, 2001). 
                                                     
1  The research was a collaboration between Richard Crook of IDS and CDD-Ghana researchers under the 
leadership of Professor Gyimah-Boadi. The important contributions of Kojo Asante and Victor Brobbey to 
the research and analysis presented here are especially acknowledged. We are also grateful for the 
contributions of other CDD staff including Daniel Armah-Attoh and Sewor Aikins, who worked on the 
questionnaires and data entry, and Kwabena Aborampah-Mensah (Programme Manager and mass survey 
supervisor).  
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The idea that ADR could be a powerful reform tool in developing countries may well have 
emerged from the ideals of some of the original campaigners for ADR, who were 
predominantly anti-state and pro-community empowerment. They sought justification in the 
popular, community-based or rural traditions of their own societies; but they also drew 
inspiration from what they saw as the virtues of traditional approaches to dispute settlement in 
African and some Asian societies. These were praised for emphasising consensus and 
socially-sanctioned compromise; hence, ADR became linked with a rhetoric of ‘harmony law’ 
(Brown and Marriott, 1999; Silbey and Sarat, 1989; Nader, 2001). This strong ‘communitarian’ 
strand in the ADR concept underpins a marked tendency in many of the justice sector reform 
programmes adopted by donors to equate ADR with customary forms of justice or chiefs’ 
courts, an equation which has become widely adopted by African advocates of ADR 
themselves. An ideal of African village justice – the ‘meeting under the tree’ in which a dispute 
is resolved through a search for community consensus and the remedies of restorative 
justice– is often cited as a basic inspiration for ADR in Africa.  Critics, on the other hand, 
suggest that this is an idealised picture which may conceal a real misunderstanding of the 
nature of community and traditional dispute settlement procedures in African societies 
(Grande, 1999; Amanor, 2008).  
 
Whilst the Ghanaian Judicial Service’s Court-connected ADR programme does not 
specifically link itself with customary justice in this way, one can detect elements of these 
ideas in the official description of the new ADR programme as a ‘holistic’ way of mediating 
disputes, which will improve access to justice by ‘demystifying’ formal legal adjudication 
(Ghana, 2008a: v; Ghana, 2010a: 5). In this respect, the Ghanaian judiciary has aligned itself 
with an international climate of opinion which advocates ADR. No doubt such international 
influences have been strengthened through the close training links which have been 
established between the Ghanaian judiciary and the Leitner Center for International Law and 
Justice at Fordham Law School, New York. Donor development partners such as DANIDA, 
UNDP and the World Bank have also been strong advocates of ADR and have been willing to 
fund Ghana’s ADR programmes.2 
 
3 The Ghana Magistrate’s Courts 
 
The 153 Magistrate’s Courts form the lowest level of the Ghanaian state court system and are 
to be found in virtually every District in the country (Ghana, 2010a: 44-49).3 They are well 
established institutions with a long history going back to the District Commissioner’s Courts 
established in the Gold Coast under the Judicature Act of 1873-5. But it was only after 
Ghana’s independence, in 1958, that the District Courts (renamed Local Courts with 
stipendiary magistrates) replaced the chiefs’ Native Courts as the sole, legally empowered 
first instance courts at the local level (Crook, 2008: 139; Rathbone, 2000: 51). Under the 
Courts Act 1993 they were renamed Community Tribunals and incorporated a panel of lay 
‘community assessors’ sitting with a legally qualified Magistrate.4 These were abolished by 
Executive Instrument in 2002 and the courts reverted to operating under a single judge, either 
legally qualified (known as a ‘Professional District Magistrate’) or specially trained (known as 
                                                     
2  The World Bank has even funded extensive training in ADR for Ghana’s traditional chiefs (Ghana, 2010a: 
25).  
3  There are now 169 local government and administrative Districts in Ghana, including the Metropolitan and 
Municipal Assemblies as well as the rural District Assemblies (www.ghanadistricts.com accessed 10/5/12). 
4  Between 1982 and 1992  the Magistrate’s Courts had run in parallel with the so-called Public Tribunals  
created during the PNDC’s ‘revolutionary’ era; these Tribunals were incorporated into the main legal 
system in the 1993 legislation and served as a form of special criminal court at the Circuit and Regional 
levels (Gocking, 2000).  
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a ‘Career District Magistrate’).5  Their official name is ‘District Court’ although they are still 
colloquially known as Magistrate’s Courts as this is the title of their judges. These courts also 
serve as Family Tribunals to hear cases arising under the Children’s Act 1998, which involve 
matters such as parentage, custody, access and maintenance, and supervision orders.  
When constituted as a Family Tribunal the judge is assisted by a panel of between two and 
five members which must include a Social Welfare Officer.  
 
The jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court covers both civil and criminal matters at first 
instance; civil matters are limited to personal actions under contract or torts (mainly 
commercial debts and damage to property, nuisance and ‘defamation’) up to a value of GC 
5000, landlord-tenant relations, matrimonial matters and land cases where the value of the 
land does not exceed GC 5000.6 Criminal jurisdiction is limited to summary offences such as 
assault, offensive or threatening conduct and theft, where the maximum fine is 500 penalty 
points or a prison term of up to two years.7  
 
Since 2005 the Magistrate’s Courts have become the venue for an important experiment in 
‘Court-connected ADR’ launched by the Judicial Service. The decision to introduce ADR into 
the formal court system was the product of a strong commitment to ADR championed by the 
former Chief Justice, George Kingsley Acquah and continued with equal vigour under Chief 
Justice Mrs Georgina Wood. The policy was clearly motivated by two main considerations: 
tackling the crisis caused by the inability of the judicial system to cope with the large numbers 
of new cases filed every year, and an acceptance of the idea that ADR is a method of dispute 
resolution which can improve access to justice for the poor and vulnerable. Table 1 shows the 
extent to which the Magistrate’s Courts are the victims of their own popularity; even though 
real efforts have been made to improve the clear-up rate over the past three years, the total 
number of both civil and criminal cases in the courts has hardly changed, such is the flood of 
new cases every year. Even the slight drop in civil cases in 2010 still represents an 81% 
increase on the total number before the Magistrate’s Courts in 2003-4 (Ghana Judicial 
Service, 2004), whilst the settlement rates have on average changed little from the 40% 
achieved in 2003-4.  
 
After piloting ADR in a few of the Accra Magistrates Courts, ADR was rolled out across all ten 
Regions of Ghana and is now (at time of writing) offered in 45 courts (41 Magistrate’s Courts 
and 4 Circuit Courts). In practice Accra and Tema still account for the majority (around 60%) 
of cases referred to ADR. A National Secretariat was set up by the Judicial Service 
Administration with a National ADR Coordinator, assisted by ten Regional ADR Coordinators, 
charged with expanding the programme to all Districts by 2015. The system was given a 
further boost by the passing of an ADR Act by Parliament in 2010. This sets out a legal 
framework for ADR practice including customary arbitration, and provides for an ADR Fund 
and a national ADR Centre. The Magistrate’s Courts ADR service is empowered to handle 
civil and minor criminal matters covering the following kinds of cases: monetary claims for 
recovery, minor assault, family maintenance claims, offensive conduct, landlord/tenant 
disputes, defamation, threat of harm or damage to property, unlawful entry and minor land 
disputes. In the Accra courts observed, there was no official breakdown available of the types 
                                                     
5  As of 2010, there were 42 Professional Magistrates and 98 Career Magistrates; the Career Magistrates 
were developed in an attempt to address the severe shortages of legally qualified candidates willing to 
serve as magistrates, a problem which had left many District Courts without a judge for many years. As 
recently as 2004 there were only 65 Magistrates to cover the 131 courts across the country – a situation 
caused, according to the official Judicial Service report, by ‘low remuneration’ (Ghana Judicial Service, 
2004: 22).  
6  5000 Ghana Cedis = approximately $2,590 or £1666 at 2012 rates. 
7  A penalty point is GC12, so the Magistrate’s Court maximum fine is GC6000 – quite a substantial amount 
in Ghana. 
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of cases heard, but there seemed to be differences in the predominance of particular kinds of 
case according to the locality. In the Ministries court, which was linked with a very busy and 
popular Family Tribunal, mediators reckoned that 70% of cases were family or ‘matrimonial’ 
affairs, with most of the others breaches of contract and debt. In La, the Registrar also noted 
that the land and property cases tended to be intra-family disputes – because the ‘families 
wanted to avoid serious divisions’ – as well as a mixture of mainly assault, defamation and 
debt cases. In Madina, James Town and Amasaman, there was more of a mixture of minor 
assault, landlord-tenant disputes, debt and family cases.  
 
Table 1: Cases in the Magistrates Courts, 2007-2010 
 
 2007-8 2008-9 2009-10
Total cases filed, 
pending + new 
183,124 187,939 178,619
Total civil cases filed, 
pending + new 
113,289 111,786 106,910
Civil cases pending 
at year end (July) 
70,189 64,619 50,214
Civil cases 
settlement rate 
38% 42% 53%
Total criminal cases 
filed, pending + new 
69,835 76,153 77,709
Criminal cases 
pending at year end 
49,272 47,280 34,114
Criminal cases 
settlement rate  
30% 38% 56%
 
Sources: Ghana Judicial Service (2008a; 2009; 2010a) 
 
A mixed set of methods was used to collect the data on both ADR mediations and on cases 
heard in full court. Three case-study Districts were selected for intensive study: one in a peri-
urban area of Greater Accra (the capital city); the second a rural cocoa-growing District in the 
Brong-Ahafo Region and the third the capital of the Northern Region, Tamale (a 
predominantly Muslim city). A further four Magistrate’s Courts in Accra were chosen for 
intensive study of ADR, given that this was where most ADR cases were being heard.  The 
primary method was observation of proceedings in the seven courts over a six month period, 
on a daily basis for the three primary case study Districts. (ADR was not offered in the Brong-
Ahafo court). Observation was combined with a representative sample survey of popular 
opinion (800 respondents) in the first two Districts, together with interviews with 300 litigants 
using a structured questionnaire, and elite semi-structured interviews with judges, mediators 
and officials. 
 
4 ADR in the Magistrate’s Courts: the formal process 
 
Litigants are referred to ADR by the Magistrate only after they have appeared before him or 
her, and with their consent; but because of the concern to make this option attractive to the 
‘poor and vulnerable’ there is currently no charge for ADR, beyond the basic filing fee which 
litigants have already paid to bring the case to the court. In order to encourage the adoption of 
ADR, Magistrates now routinely put the option of ADR or ‘amicable settlement’ to parties 
when they first appear, and in most of the courts observed the ADR coordinator (one of the 
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court officials or the Registrar) gives a short explanation of ADR at the opening of each day’s 
proceedings.  In courts where the Magistrate is very committed to the policy, it was clear that 
ADR was often being promoted by judges particularly where they felt that the case was 
‘suitable’ for ADR, giving rise to the danger that parties could be pressured into mediation. In 
one court, the judge regarded family cases as almost automatically referable to ADR. There is 
an obvious motivation for judges to use referrals to help clear case-loads, given that this is an 
official goal of the policy anyway.  
 
Once the parties have opted for ADR, the court ADR coordinator explains the system to them 
in more detail. It is stressed that ADR is voluntary and depends on a willingness to agree; but 
that once an agreement has been reached it will be ratified by the Magistrate as a judgement 
of the court, and that there is no appeal.8  
 
The cases are heard by a newly recruited and trained body of para-legal Court Mediators, at 
least three for each Court. Officially, parties can ‘choose’ their mediator, but in practice it just 
depends on who is available that day. The mediators were deliberately recruited from the 
ranks of ‘retired professionals’ (mainly social workers, police officers, ex-court officials or 
teachers) under the age of 65 or ‘self employed’ people, although in Accra the pool was 
boosted with a number of specially recruited, younger social workers.9  Initially they were paid 
on a per-case basis at the rate of 5 Ghana cedis per case successfully settled, but because of 
financial constraints are now limited to claiming for a maximum of 10 per month.   
 
The procedures used by the Court Mediators are supposed to conform to a model laid down 
in the Judicial Service’s ‘Uniform Practice Manual on Court-connected ADR’, produced with 
the support of UNDP (Ghana Judicial Service, nd). All of the Court Mediators have undergone 
training based on this manual, and observation of cases suggested that for the most part they 
were implementing the basic principles and devices in which they had been trained.   
 
The case usually begins with the mediator explaining that ADR is different from a court trial 
because it’s about the parties themselves finding an acceptable agreement – so it’s about 
compromise or ‘for the sake of peace’ between the parties – implying that ideally there should 
be some form of reconciliation or, at the least, acceptance that a dispute is over. The 
mediator also checks that the parties have really agreed to ADR and they have to sign a 
consent form. (One mediator urged them to be realistic and not to press too hard for money 
which they knew the other one didn’t have). The proceedings are supposed to be in private 
and confidential, involving only the parties themselves and the mediator, with a minimum of 
witnesses who are only called in when needed – although this was a condition which was not 
always observed in practice, as the case observations will show.  
 
The procedure for hearing the case is very simple and informal, and puts a premium on giving 
each party a chance to present their point of view on the dispute. The complainant begins by 
stating their complaint and setting out what they are seeking from the process. The mediator 
may interrupt or ask the complainant a number of questions in order to clarify aspects of the 
story or of their demands.  The respondent is then invited to give their version of events and 
what they think would be an appropriate response or the terms on which they would be 
prepared to settle. In most cases the ensuing discussion is actively led by the mediator as he 
or she tries to draw out from each party in turn what the real issues are, and in particular to 
clarify the facts of the case. It is the mediator who in the end suggests what an appropriate 
                                                     
8  The logic of this is that a party cannot appeal against their own agreement.  
9  In practice many of the mediators are older than 65 – one in Tamale was 77. Recruitment has proved 
increasingly difficult as the ability of the Judicial Service to pay even the small fees has come into doubt, 
with serious backlogs of payment and consequent demoralisation (Ghana Judicial Service, 2008b: 18). 
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settlement might be, having assessed what seems both fair and realistic with regard to the 
positions of each party.  
 
A number of devices are used to defuse tension and hostility between the parties, the most 
common being told to address each other by their names, to show respect and not interrupt 
each other, and ‘caucusing’. The latter is a practice used when there is an impasse or conflict; 
one or both parties are taken aside for a private discussion in which the mediator tries to find 
out what the sticking point is and what they are prepared to accept. This can also be used at 
the beginning of the session in order to get an idea of where each party stands, and what they 
are really wanting from the process. This is to help the mediator guide the discussion in the 
direction which is most likely to result in agreement.  
 
Once a case is settled under the ADR procedure, the parties return to court for the Magistrate 
to enter the agreement as a ‘consent judgement’. This gives it the status of a legal judgement 
which can be enforced by the court bailiffs if one party fails to honour the agreement. If the 
mediator cannot resolve the dispute through a mutual agreement the parties have to go back 
to court for the normal trial process to resume. But none of the facts brought out or 
statements made during the mediation can be brought up in court, and indeed mediators are 
supposed to destroy any written records of the mediation sessions (see Ghana Judicial 
Service, nd: 23).  The ADR process is therefore both confidential and, in legal terms, ‘without 
prejudice’.  
 
5 ADR in action: how congruent with popular values and 
expectations? 
 
5.1 Popular values10 
 
Our survey of popular opinion in the three case-study Districts showed that when ordinary 
Ghanaians were asked to define what they regarded as a fair way of settling disputes, the 
majority (68%) put most value on the necessity for an impartial and/ or competent judge who 
could ensure that the ‘truth’ would come out and that all parties were given a chance to 
present their side of the story. (These views were especially prevalent amongst those who 
had had actual experience of a dispute – 20% of the sample). This is very much a ‘process’ 
definition of fairness.  An important minority of respondents (14%) also emphasised the need 
for both parties to publicly accept or acknowledge the truth once established, particularly 
where one party was shown to be at fault. This idea was linked with the possibility of 
reconciliation – which has to be distinguished from compromise, where people may agree to 
accept a sub-optimal settlement for the sake of better relations or social harmony.  
 
Litigants who had civil cases in the Magistrates Courts shared some of these values, but 
displayed a rather different set of concerns in their search for justice ,which are of particular 
significance when assessing the appeal of Court-connected ADR.  As might be predicted, by 
the time disputants arrive in court, their attitudes to the other parties have already hardened 
and they are in no mood for compromise. Relationships, particularly in intra-family inheritance 
or land cases have often deteriorated into violent hostility. Indeed, 53% of the litigants 
interviewed had taken their case straight to the court, without even trying an informal or non-
state dispute resolution institution first. Thus In assessing the value of having their cases 
heard in court, 45% of litigants (both plaintiffs and defendants) emphasised the importance of 
                                                     
10  A full account of the surveys upon which the data in this section are based can be found in Crook et al. 
(2010; 2011).   
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getting an enforceable legal remedy, which would ‘change the behaviour’ of the other party 
and establish who was at fault. Only 7% mentioned the benefits of impartiality. On the other 
hand, an important minority (23%) drawn mainly from those who were dissatisfied with the 
whole experience, felt that the court had offered the opportunity of a peaceful settlement, or 
that they would have preferred to have gone for an amicable settlement – about the same 
proportion as those who said they had tried ADR (17%) .  
 
The more generally held notions of justice were, however, echoed quite clearly by those 
whose cases had been determined.11 When asked to explain why they thought the verdict 
was fair or unfair, a majority (58%) said the verdict was fair to the extent that the truth had 
come out and been accepted or not accepted by the party at fault, and/or that both sides had 
been properly heard.  Nevertheless, a substantial minority (one third) of those who had had 
verdicts focused primarily on whether they had got the remedy they wanted – for them it was 
mainly about winning, by getting the legally enforceable remedy.  
 
It is clear from the above that only a minority – albeit a significant one -- of litigants who resort 
to the Magistrates Courts come with a mindset which is likely to be favourable to the mediated 
compromise offered by ADR. The rate of ‘out of court’ settlement in Ghana is in fact 
extraordinarily low, compared to other common law systems (Crook et al., 2007). Even those 
willing to try ADR are, like the other litigants, still likely to put a high value on an enforceable 
settlement.  And they will also value an impartial, ‘truth seeking’ process.  
 
5.2 Principles and codes of settlement used in ADR 
 
Observation of cases which had been sent for ADR mediation by the Magistrates of the courts 
at Madina, James Town, Amasaman, La, and Ministries (all in Accra) and Tamale showed 
that, as noted above, the mediators were generally conforming to the requirement to offer an 
impartial and balanced process. Mediators in many cases were prepared to spend more than 
two to three hours patiently trying to sort out the details of what had happened between the 
parties; in one case, for instance, a dispute concerning an alleged breach of contract between 
a businesswoman and a trader to whom she had supplied jeans and shirts, the mediator 
spent a whole afternoon with both parties, going through a chaotic and incomplete set of 
delivery notes and accounts in detail, trying to work out what had been promised, at what 
price, and what had been actually delivered. It was basically a misunderstanding deriving 
from poor record keeping. Frequently the mediator had to ask the woman, who was the more 
aggressive of the two, to let the man make his point; ‘you’ve had all the time in the world to 
make your case’, he says. In the end, no agreement could be reached, with the mediator 
advising the trader to take a course in business administration.12  
 
In another contract case, a woman day-nursery owner complained that a carpenter had failed 
to deliver benches and tables for her school, for which she had paid an advance. 
Unfortunately, as the mediator established, there was no written record of the contract price 
or of the advance she had given him. But the mediator made an extensive effort to establish 
the true facts by engaging with both parties; and then used a private conversation with the 
complainant to suggest that she accept an offer from the carpenter to finish the job within one 
month. She agreed, although she was sceptical (she’d ‘heard it all before’ from the carpenter) 
and insisted that her legal costs be deducted from the agreed final price, on delivery.13  
 
                                                     
11  37% of those interviewed. 
12  La District Court, 9th February 2011. 
13  Ministries District Court, 9th February 2011. 
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A very different kind of case involved an allegation of assault, very typical of the many minor 
criminal cases remitted to ADR.  At first sight this appeared to be a trivial quarrel, in which two 
young women complain that two young men, their neighbours, had assaulted them because 
their dog ate the food of the boys’ pet cat. All the parties were illiterate and the parents of both 
families attended, creating a rowdy and constantly interrupted hearing. The mediator spent 
two hours trying to establish what had happened, through constant interchanges and 
conversations with both sides, often alternating between jokes and stern reprimands 
especially to the young people and to an aggressive mother who tried to challenge 
statements from the opposing side. In effect, the mediator was conducting a continuous yet 
flexible or informal cross-examination of all the parties. He eventually established that 
underlying the quarrel was a much longer-running dispute involving the boundaries between 
their properties along the street frontage. Although he managed to persuade the parties to 
shake hands and agree (with obvious reluctance) to make peace over the pet food quarrel, 
they were required to return the following week to resolve the more serious property dispute.14  
 
In none of these cases would a Magistrate have had the time or the patience (in the absence 
of documentation) to hear the details of what each party had to say, and to try to work out a 
solution that seemed acceptable; finding a legal rule to apply would not have been easy or 
necessarily relevant. Nor would a formal cross examination by a lawyer have been very 
effective in drawing out what the real problem was, or what might be a viable solution. In this 
respect, therefore, the ADR procedure was clearly working well as a device for ‘seeking the 
truth’, using a process which was transparently fair to both sides (neither side was being 
intimidated by a lawyer).  
 
It was very evident, however, that the emphasis of ADR on the search for reconciliation, 
compromise and mutual agreement was a feature of ADR which often provoked resistance 
from disputants. This emphasis was not just an official purpose as promoted in the ADR 
training; for many mediators it was clearly a personal moral commitment which justified their 
work. Typical comments from mediators were that ADR was about ‘healing the two parties’, 
‘helping people to resolve their problems’, ‘reconciling people’, or ‘as we are all under one 
God we should love one another and make peace’. 15 Many also felt that ADR was especially 
relevant for family conflicts, and one saw her job as helping to prevent family break-up.16 As 
one said, they did not do it for the monetary reward, which is not only very modest and barely 
covers the cost of their transport and other expenses, but is rarely even paid on time.17   
 
This personal commitment of the mediators often, therefore, led them to exert a fair degree of 
pressure on the parties to agree to a settlement, even when they seemed reluctant or still 
hostile. It would be easy to dismiss this as a function of the original payment system which 
was linked to the number of cases settled. But their behaviour did not change after their 
payment was capped at 10 cases per month. Unfortunately their ideals were most often 
challenged by the harsh realities of family conflict in Ghana.  
 
In spite of their commitment to family values, it was most frequently the presence or 
involvement of relatives of the disputing parties which created the most resistance to 
settlement or led to the unravelling of agreements which the mediator had persuaded the 
parties to accept. In one case, for instance, involving a commercial driver who owed money to 
                                                     
14  La District Court, 9th February 2011. 
15  Interviews with CD, Madina,7th December 2010; O, Amasaman, 7th December 2010; SD, Tamale, 4th 
Februrary 2011. 
16  Interview with CD, Madina, 7th December 2010. 
17  Interview with JO, Amasaman, 8th December 2010. In January 2011 the National ADR Coordinator 
admitted that mediators had not been paid for nearly a year (interview 26th January 2011). 
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two women traders, the mediator had been on the point of agreeing a plan for the driver to 
repay his debt in instalments when one of the women said she needed to consult her 
husband. The mediator predicted that this would probably lead to a rejection of the 
settlement; sure enough, when she returned, she withdrew from the agreement.18  Another 
mediator said that allowing the parties to leave the mediation and consult relatives was a 
constant danger as it would lead to ‘their minds being polluted’. She recalled one case where 
a complainant’s husband had burst into the hearing and simply demanded that his wife refuse 
to sign any agreement.19 Third parties try to exert pressure and some mediators feared being 
subjected to ‘evil forces’ (‘juju’) aimed at influencing their judgement, as if they were judges 
with a power of adjudication.20 Indeed, in an effort to sustain ADR settlements, the 
Magistrates of the courts observed had adopted the practice of asking the mediators to bring 
the agreements to court for immediate endorsement as consent judgements as soon as the 
case was concluded, even if this meant they had to stay at work late. This was to prevent the 
parties changing their minds.   
 
The resistance to settlements created by the involvement of relatives and other parties was 
also considerably exacerbated by the lack of private rooms available for ADR in all but one of 
the five courts observed. In one court, ADR mediations were being heard in the corner of a 
main office which contained the cashier’s desk so that there was a constant queue of people 
causing interruptions; in another, to the side of the entrance to the main administration office. 
The worst situation was where the full court room, vacated for the purpose, was being used.21 
This meant that not only relatives and witnesses but even other litigants waiting for their 
cases to be called were sitting in the court room, in effect turning the mediation into a public 
hearing. In the ‘pet food’ case cited above, the parents of one of the parties kept shouting and 
interrupting the proceedings to such an extent that they had to be ejected by a police officer 
and the mediator threatened them with arrest. Other people sitting in the court room also got 
involved in the case, laughing or exclaiming as the mediator made jokes or indulged in moral 
homilies (at one point he asked rhetorically: ‘is it right that the animals should be friendly but 
we humans should not?’). All of this made it more difficult to create the calm atmosphere 
needed for an agreement, and entrenched the attitudes of hostility which existed between the 
parties and their families.  
 
The most important cause of resistance to settlement was, however, a more basic factor: the 
degree to which the case involved such high stakes for one or both of the parties that they 
could not easily give up what they saw as their rights. This was especially true of land and 
inheritance disputes. A typical case was again one which initially presented itself as a minor 
assault charge: the respondent, D, had been charged with threatening behaviour after the 
complainant, Y, alleged that she had cursed her with a death threat when she attempted to 
take possession of a piece of land which she said she had bought from a local Ga family. The 
respondent was actually the current occupier of the land, part of a plot which her husband had 
purchased 13 years previously on which he had built a house, and on which she (the 
respondent) had set up a kiosk along the roadside. An attempt had been made to settle the 
affair amicably using the elders of their local Pentecostal church, but this had failed because 
the complainant insisted on having the land dispute dealt with at the same time. D had then 
been charged in the Magistrate’s court.   
 
                                                     
18  James Town District Court, 7th December 2010. 
19  Interview with JO, Amasaman, 8th December 2010. 
20  Interview with CD, Madina, 7th December 2010. 
21  This was at the La District Court – a court cited by the Judicial Service as one of their best performing 
models for ADR.  
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The mediator had decided, perhaps unwisely, to try to deal with the land issue at the same 
time as the threatening behaviour charge and this produced a two hour session of enormous 
complexity involving not just the two women but their respective partners, land surveyors and 
representatives of the family which claimed it had a right to sell the land occupied by D and 
her husband.  The respondent and her husband were clearly absolutely furious and regarded 
the whole episode as a case of attempted fraudulent land sale; D’s husband made it quite 
clear that he had purchased the land under a properly documented deal and denied that the 
family concerned had any rights whatsoever to sell it to Y. He and the respondent were not 
prepared to accept any challenge to their ownership and possession. The exchanges during 
the mediation were very hostile and emotional with frequent rejections and rows and the 
mediator experienced great difficulty in controlling the proceedings. It was only because the 
mediator was a very strong and forceful personality that he ‘persuaded’ D to make a formal 
apology to Y and shake hands, in a way which she clearly experienced as a public 
humiliation.  Part of the persuasion was the possibility that she could be found guilty if it went 
back to court, although the mediator also suggested that the husbands might have settled it 
had they spoken to each other ‘man-to-man’ – a suggestion rejected by D’s husband.  
 
The continuing dispute over Y’s claim to the land was scheduled for another hearing the 
following week, but in an interview after the mediation, Y and her husband made it clear that 
they would not bring any documentation to the ADR session as this might prejudice any 
subsequent trial in court. Whilst they were sorry for Y, who they saw as a victim of the fraud, 
they had no intention of accepting any challenge to their ownership of the land.  
 
This case is a good illustration of the limits of ADR; it may be doubted that such a serious 
matter (fraudulent land sale) can really dealt with by ADR when the stakes are so high; 
people’s home and livelihood were under threat from this illegal activity and there was little 
likelihood that in this urban setting the respondents would be willing to compromise over such 
a fundamental threat to their interests, merely for the sake of ‘peace’. They wanted their 
formal legal title confirmed. 
 
Overall, therefore, the Court-connected ADR mediations did correspond quite well to the 
popular belief in the importance of a truth seeking, balanced process. And the fact that the 
agreements could be enforced as consent judgements also helped to make the ADR 
procedure seem as good as a trial in full court, given that a primary motivation for litigants in 
court was to obtain a certain and enforceable remedy. But the emphasis of ADR on 
compromise at the expense of legal rights did not fully correspond with either the specific 
concerns of a considerable proportion of the litigants, or with popular beliefs more generally 
about the need to accept fault.22 And for many, the stakes were simply too high, or the dispute 
too bitter.  
 
6 The accessibility of ADR 
 
The ADR mediations can be scored very highly in terms of their accessibility to ordinary 
people, no matter how poorly educated.23 The sessions were all conducted entirely in 
                                                     
22  The importance of accepting fault and rendering public apology has some roots in older traditions of 
dispute resolution, at least in Akan culture – see Rattray (1969: 388).  
23  The sample of litigants in the Magistrate’s Courts tended, however, to be older and better educated 
compared to the general population profile: 48% were over 40 years old, compared to 35% of the adult 
population aged over 19 in the Accra Region; 36% had a secondary or post-secondary educational level, 
compared to 26% in the Accra Region (although this figure includes all those over six years old, so 
overstating the percentage for the adult population). Only 9.5% were illiterate compared to 20% of those 
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whatever local languages were appropriate for the parties, although in some cases, 
particularly in Tamale, English was the only common language. But generally this was better 
than the full court in that it was more spontaneous and there were no delays for translation, in 
spite of the extensive use of local languages by the Magistrates during statements and cross 
examinations. ADR was also a much cheaper option compared to going on with the full legal 
case, in that the parties were not charged any further fees after paying their basic ‘filing fee’, 
usually around GC15 ($7.50). If litigants go on to a full trial the fees could amount to GC50 
($25) or more. The process was also much less costly because the case is usually settled 
more quickly (see below) and the services of their lawyers, if they have been engaged, could 
be dispensed with, although it should be noted that only 33% of litigants surveyed had used 
lawyers.24 Nevertheless 40% of litigants surveyed said they had spent up to GC100, and 
another 36% between GC101 and GC500 during the litigation process, so the savings from 
choosing ADR could be considerable.    
 
The procedures of ADR were also completely informal and ‘de-legalised’; the style was 
conversational and intimate wherever possible (although as noted above this was not always 
the case where there was limited privacy and involvement of other witnesses and family 
members). Legal language was rarely used except to remind parties of the legal position if 
they rejected ADR and went back to court, or the rights and wrongs of somebody’s position 
had to be explained – e.g. on custody of children or landlord-tenant relations.  In this respect, 
ADR was more informal than the procedure in court, in spite of the efforts of Magistrates to 
create a more informal process (Crook et al., 2010).  
 
The ‘moral codes’ or principles of settlement which mediators tended to draw on during the 
sessions were quite varied and certainly did not exclude the citation of legal rights or duties. 
But the basic message of ADR was the appeal to ‘make peace’ and achieve a reconciliation 
between the parties which would reduce the hostility and tension which existed between 
them. It was therefore not surprising that mediators made frequent use of the vocabulary of 
Christianity, given the widespread popularity of evangelical Christianity in Ghana. Many 
mediators used prayers, ‘sharing a Bible story’ or a Bible reading to start the proceedings, 
although in their training they were told not to do this unless certain that the parties were both 
Christians. Nevertheless it seemed to be assumed that this was appropriate because it 
corresponded with what mediators saw as a shared popular culture (which they themselves 
shared). Even in Tamale, where the parties were likely to be Muslim, the mediator (a southern 
Christian) said that he advised the parties that ‘we are all under one God and so we should 
love one another and make peace’. If he identified the parties as Muslims he would ask one of 
them to lead a prayer ‘in the Muslim way’. Nevertheless the Court staff here began each day 
with a Christian prayer meeting led by the Magistrate. 
 
The way in which these ideas were used can be illustrated by a case involving a violent 
dispute between a mother and her son, in which the mother brought criminal assault charges 
against her son. The problem was that the mother wanted to evict her son from their home, 
where he ran his clothing design business in a shop in front of the house, claiming he didn’t 
pay his electricity bills, and had too many drunken parties. The conflict had come to a head in 
a violent row during which she had called the police and the son had been arrested and left in 
police cells for a week. As an agreement for the son to leave the premises was being worked 
                                                                                                                                                        
over 15 in Accra (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000). There were slightly more men than women – 58.7% 
were men and 41.3% women.   
24  Although lawyers are permitted to attend ADR mediations, it is rare, and none were observed during the 
research period. On the whole, barristers who practise in the lower courts are not supportive of ADR 
(which they see as a threat to their profession) and both mediators and Magistrates reported that barristers 
routinely advised their clients to refuse ADR or even to go back to court after an ADR hearing. 
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out, the mediator argued that the son’s behaviour was due to his possession by the Devil. The 
son thereupon brought in as his witness and supporter his pastor, who confirmed that he had 
now accepted Jesus Christ. The mediator was very pleased by this and argued that his 
agreement to the ‘terms suggested’ would be a living proof that he had changed his wicked 
ways and escaped the Devil’s influence.25 
 
Another cultural norm frequently invoked by the mediators was respect for the elderly – a 
value also used by the Magistrates in full court hearings. In the case of the son accused of 
assaulting his mother cited above, the mediator did not really attempt to ascertain the truth or 
otherwise of the accusations and counter-accusations flying between them; instead, 
sympathising with the mother’s plea that she ‘just wanted him out’, he sought an agreement 
that involved the son moving out. The mediator advised the son (a man in his mid-thirties) to 
accept that ‘his mother could do no wrong’ and that he should apologise and show her 
respect. This he did (kneeling in front of her as he apologised), and agreed to the terms of the 
settlement because he just wanted to get out of the situation and not face police charges.26 
Another mediator argued that in family cases, as a matter of general principle, the right 
course of action was always for children and younger family members to apologise, in order 
to keep the family together.27  
 
7 The effectiveness of ADR 
 
From the point of view of the Judicial Service, one of the main goals in introducing Court-
connected ADR was the hope that this option would be speedier and thereby help to reduce 
the delays and backlog of cases clogging up the formal court system. There is no doubt that 
ADR was quicker than persisting with the action in court. The official target given to mediators 
was that they should settle cases within 30 days, and remit the case back to court if it was not 
possible to deal with it within that time frame, although it was possible to ask for an extension 
(Ghana Judicial Service, nd). In practice, most of the cases were dealt with in one or two 
mediation sessions. One ADR officer cited with pride a case involving two step brothers, in 
dispute over their father’s estate, which had been in court for 10 years but was resolved by 
the ADR mediator in 30 minutes.28 ADR therefore compared very favourably with going for the 
full trial process, with its constant adjournments and delays; 55% of the litigants surveyed said 
they had already had to attend court more than six times, and 30% between two and five 
times, although it was observed that once a case was actually heard in court, the Magistrate 
usually disposed of it within two or three sittings. Land cases took longer because of the need 
for site inspections and other investigations.  
 
The real challenge facing ADR, however, was its effectiveness in actually achieving 
settlements. As noted, there was frequently considerable resistance to making a compromise 
agreement, and the settlement rates for ADR reflect this (see Table 2). Between 2007 and 
2010, the settlement rate for ADR was only a little better than that of the courts, except for 
2009 when it achieved an unusually high percentage, but slipped back to below the court rate 
in 2010. This was rather surprising and certainly disappointing for those in the Judicial Service 
who had had such high hopes for the programme.   
                                                     
25  Amasaman District Court, 11th September 2009. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Interview with CD, Madina, 7th December 2010. 
28  Interview with GO, La, 8th December 2010. 
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Table 2: ADR in the Magistrate’s Courts, 2006-2010 
 
 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 
Cases mediated 
 
853 1723 5358 3764 
Cases settled 
 
466 807 3871 1633 
Settlement rate 
 
55% 47% 72% 43% 
Settlement rate 
in Courts: civil 
N/A 38% 42% 53% 
Settlement rate 
in Courts: 
criminal 
N/A 30% 38% 56% 
ADR cases 
settled as % total 
pending  
0.47% 0.68% 3.5% 2.0% 
ADR cases 
settled as % civil 
pending 
0.8% 1.0% 6.0% 3.3% 
 
Sources: Ghana Judicial Service (2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2010a; 2010b). 
 
Although any judgement on the programme has to recognise that it is still only in a pilot 
phase, with the majority of ADR mediations confined to the Accra-Tema courts, it is clear that 
ADR is not yet making any significant impact on the overall backlog of cases in the formal 
system. But the low settlement rate, particularly the drop back to under 50% in 2010, cannot 
be blamed on entirely on the reluctance of litigants to settle amicably. There are also real 
problems of finance and staffing which are having an impact on the success and even likely 
survival of the programme in the immediate future.  
 
The main funder for the start of the ADR programme was DANIDA, with minor contributions 
from UNDP. With the DANIDA funding coming to an end, the Judicial Service has had to take 
over responsibility for the costs of ADR – mainly the National Secretariat and the fees of the 
mediators – since 2010. Unfortunately the Judicial Service budgets have been severely 
squeezed over the past few years and this has created a crisis in the recruitment and 
payment of mediators. As well as capping the number of cases which they can claim for each 
month to 10, mediators have experienced severe delays in receiving payment, with many not 
having been paid at all since February 2010. This has had a serious impact on morale and 
many have resigned or stopped turning up; interviews with mediators in our case-study courts 
revealed that many continued only because of their sense of moral commitment. But others 
have already petitioned the Chief Justice and the Judicial Service leaders to abandon the cap 
on 10 cases per month, increase the payments substantially, improve the physical conditions 
and ensure that existing payment contracts are honoured.  
 
The senior officials and judges of the Judicial Service have not formally responded but the 
Service is actively considering how to fund the ADR programme in a more sustainable way. 
One method (discussed with APPP researchers at a Judicial Service Workshop on ADR in 
July 2011) would be to charge a fee for the ADR mediation, set at a level which would still 
make it cheaper than going to trial in the full court. But the ADR Secretariat and senior judges 
are reluctant to abandon the ‘free’ character of ADR, arguing that it would make Court-
connected ADR less attractive and hence less accessible than the similar service offered by 
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full time salaried officers of CHRAJ in its district offices (Crook et al., 2010). Another way of 
raising funds which has been suggested by the ADR Secretariat is to introduce a small 
increase in the basic filing fee and earmark an element of that fee for the ADR programme, 
regardless of whether the complainant uses ADR or not. This could be seen as rather unfair 
to litigants who do not choose ADR, but has the merit of reducing the cost by spreading it 
more widely and it retains the ‘free at the point of use’ character of the ADR mediations. 
DANIDA is now (at the time of writing) considering further aid to the ADR programme but this 
will not be sufficient to ensure its long term sustainability. Without substantial new funding, the 
aim of extending ADR to all District Courts by 2015 is unlikely to be achieved. And 
maintaining the quality and impartiality of the mediations will ultimately require the mediators 
to be salaried officials like those of the CHRAJ, which also costs more money.  
 
8 Conclusion 
 
The evidence from the APPP research shows that the new Court-connected ADR programme 
in Ghana is successfully offering a process which is not only informal and accessible to 
ordinary people but also works with local cultural repertoires, corresponds with local 
understandings of justice and provides remedies which to some extent respond to the 
demands of those who resort to or are brought before the state courts. The ADR mediations 
certainly fulfil the popular desire for dispute settlement to be a ‘truth seeking’ and balanced 
process, which also offers an opportunity for fault to be recognised and apologies made; the 
agreements are enforceable as court judgements, which is a major motivation for those 
seeking state justice, and the kinds of codes used in settlement draw on elements of popular 
shared norms such as Christianity and respect for the elderly. But the emphasis of ADR on 
agreement through compromise is not as popular as might be expected, given the 
widespread stereotypes which surround notions of ‘African’ justice. Mediators faced 
considerable difficulties and resistance in achieving agreements between parties who had 
come to court, because they were already in a state of mind which was hostile to an amicable 
settlement; even the prospect of saving money and time did not alter the determination of 
over half of disputants to get what they saw as their due, through a legal remedy.   
 
ADR was not therefore as effective as expected, although certainly speedier and cheaper 
than a full trial in court.  To some extent the resistance to compromise can be attributed to the 
‘difficult’ character of many of the cases referred to ADR. In modern, urban Ghana the stakes 
involved in commercial transactions, land and property relations and even family affairs are 
often too high for people to accept compromise easily; conflicts are too intense and the 
consequences of losing legal rights too serious. Moreover, given the nature of Ghanaian 
family relationships, a property dispute cannot always be confined to just two private 
individuals as assumed by classic ADR doctrine. In Ghana, the extended family, as embodied 
in the ‘head of family’, is often the corporate owner of real property (houses and land) and the 
moral obligation to give mutual support attributed to the extended family is very widely 
invoked – although just as frequently contested. The conflictual nature of these obligations 
and relationships was clearly evident in many of the ADR mediations. Once family interests 
were brought into the disputes observed, it was very common for the ADR compromises to be 
rejected or modified. When it came to family cases, in the sense of ‘matrimonial affairs’ 
involving breakdowns in relationships between husbands and wives, custody of children, 
maintenance agreements and domestic violence, many ADR mediators felt that ADR was 
especially suitable, perhaps not inappropriately given that so much of their work was linked to 
that of the Magistrate’s Family Tribunals. Adopting the role of a marriage guidance counsellor, 
it was possible for a patient and forceful mediator to broker an agreed settlement of a 
‘matrimonial affair’. But overall there is little evidence that these family disputes were any less 
bitter and conflictual than those involving property alone.   
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In spite of its current limitations, the record of the Court-connected ADR programme therefore 
confirms the crucial role of the state in organising and sustaining a genuinely informal, 
popular and accessible form of dispute resolution. Whilst many forms of ADR in Ghana 
flourish in the non-state sector, at the level of families, churches and village elders or chiefs, it 
would be very difficult for any privately-based collective action, whether based on an 
association or other religious or cultural institutions, to create a programme of informal dispute 
resolution with the authority, organisational support, professional mediation skills, and 
national spread of the Court-connected ADR.  The ability to give ADR agreements the force of 
a state court’s judgement is particularly important; but so too is the capacity to provide a form 
of mediation which manages to be responsive to, indeed share, popular values and 
expectations whilst maintaining a consistency of standards. The practical hybridity of the 
Court-connected ADR is at the core of what success it has enjoyed, even though it has yet to 
change a well-entrenched culture of resistance to amicable settlement amongst those who go 
to court to settle their disputes.  
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